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Does the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Create Jobs 
at Subsidized Firms? 
JOHN H. BISHOP and MARK MONTGOMERY 
This paper uses the results of a survey of more than 3,500 private employers to determine 
whether use of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) alters the level of a firm's 
employment and/or whom the firm hires. We estimate that each subsidized hire generates 
between .13 and .3 new jobs at a participating firm. Use of the program also appears to 
induce employers to hire more young workers (age 25 and under). Our results suggest, 
however, that at least 70 percent of the tax credits granted employers are payments for 
workers who would have been hired even without the subsidy. Such payments represent 
mere transfers to employers. 
Introduction 
For more than a decade federal employment policy has included provisions for 
subsidies to employers who hire welfare recipients or people who fall into certain other 
categories of disadvantaged workers. The most prominent of these subsidies is the 
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC). Until the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the TJTC program 
offered employers a tax credit of 50 percent of the first-year wages up to $6,000, and 25 
percent of second-year wages up to $6,000 for hiring any worker certified to be eligible. 
Currently the program offers 40 percent of wages up to $6,000 during the first year. 
Eligible workers include economically disadvantaged ex-offenders, the vocationally 
rehabilitated handicapped, and recipients of Aid for Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) and/or general assistance. Though use was initially slight, the scale of the 
program has been rising, so that by the mid-eighties nearly 700,000 workers were being 
subsidized under the program. 
The purpose of targeted employment subsidies is to increase employment of 
eligible workers. The subsidy can accomplish this by inducing firms to create new jobs 
(expand employment) that are then filled by targeted workers, and/or by encouraging 
firms to hire targeted workers to fill slots normally occupied by noneligible workers. In 
practice, a firm that receives a TJTC subsidy may do neither. The firm may simply be 
claiming a tax credit for an employee who would have been hired even without the 
subsidy. The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which receiving tax 
credits for hiring TJTC eligibles represents each of the following three components: (a) 
net job creation, (b) replacement of nontargeted workers with targeted ones, or (c) receipt 
of a subsidy for a worker who would have been hired in any case. No previous study has 
attempted to make this measurement.1 Yet the issue is important for policy makers who 
clearly prefer expansion of employment (a) to merely making transfer payments to 
employers (c). 
This study is conducted using a survey of more than 3,400 employers specifically 
designed to address the issues described above. To determine whether TJTC induces 
firms to expand employment we estimate the impact that hiring TJTC-subsidized workers 
has on employment growth. The periods of time for which we have data are 1981 and 
part of 1982. We then examine whether TJTC alters who the firm hires. Ideally, this 
would be accomplished by estimating the impact of TJTC use on the proportion of 
targeted workers in the firm's work force. Because firms generally don't know how many 
of their workers meet TJTC's complicated eligibility requirements, however, our survey 
used the proportion of young workers (under 25) as a proxy for the proportion of targeted 
workers. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the employer 
survey used in this study. The second section specifies the model of employment growth 
used to determine whether use of TJTC causes net job creation at the firm. The third 
section presents the empirical results for the employment growth effect of TJTC. The 
fourth section presents estimates of the impact of TJTC on the proportion of young 
workers at the firm. The fifth section summarizes and draws conclusions. 
Data 
Our data are drawn from a survey of more than 3,400 business establishments 
conducted in two waves. The first wave was carried out in the first quarter of 1980 by the 
Institute for Research on Poverty of the University of Wisconsin under the auspices of the 
Department of Labor. (Westat Inc. did the actual interviewing.) The second wave, of 
3,412 of the original firms, was conducted by the National Center for Research in 
Vocational Education of the Ohio State University (NCRVE) in 1982. (The Gallup 
Organization did the interviewing.) The establishments surveyed were located in a set of 
28 geographic sites. The sites overrepresented the Southeast, especially the Gulf Coast, 
and underrepresented the Northeast. The probability that a given firm at a given site 
would be sampled varied directly with the size of the firm. The NCRVE Survey provides 
data on employer use of TJTC programs in 1980, 1981, and early 1982. It also contains 
data on firms' use of programs under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA) and the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) for the calendar year 1980 and the 
period from January 1980 to the interview date in early 1982. 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics on the rates of use of TJTC by 
employers in our sample. These participation rates are not representative of those of the 
general population of firms. Because the first wave of the NCRVE survey (in 1980) 
informed respondents about the existence of these programs, familiarity with TJTC 
1 
Burtless (1985) presents experimental evidence that programs like TJTC may actually reduce the employment of targeted workers 
by stigmatizing them in the eyes of potential employers. This suggests that even if the current study finds that employers who hire 
targeted workers are creating jobs for them, it will not guarantee that the overall effect of the program is to increase their employment. 
TABLE 1 
PARTICIPATION IN TJTC BY SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENT 
Number of Employees T o t a l T o t a l N o t 
Weighted Weighted 
1-9 10-49 50-99 100-499 500+ by Size by Size 
1 Percent received TJTC in 1980" 
2 Percent received TJTC be-
tween Jan and Sept 1981" 
3 Percent received TJTC be-
tween Sept 1981 and Apr 
1982a 
4 TJTC-subsidized employees in 
1980 as % of employment 
5 TJTC-subsidized employeesb in 
1981 as % of employment 
38 
2.6 
23 
46 
44 
28 
73 
99 
82 
5 1 
19 8 
17 9 
29 4 
47 5 
34 9 
14 6 
21.3 
16 1 
43 
35 
27 
02 
04 
29 
54 
10 
1 8 
aRows I, 2, and 3 are weighted by employment in 1980 and the inverse of the probability of selection 
bData are for the first 9 months of calendar year 1981 
among respondents in the second wave was about 75 percent.2 We believe this to be a 
higher rate of familiarity than would be observed in the general population of firms. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 present participation rates by establishment size for three 
periods: 1980, the first nine months of 1981, and for the period from September 1981 to 
the interview date in 1982, respectively. The period January-September 1981 is separated 
from the rest of 1981 because the rules for certifying eligibles changed in September 
1981. After that time eligible workers could be certified only on or before the first day of 
work, and cooperative education students were no longer eligible unless they were 
disadvantaged. This rule change disallowed the retroactive certification that had 
previously been widely observed among participating firms. Overall utilization rates in 
our sample were under 5 percent for all periods. Larger firms were much more likely to 
use the program than were small firms. This is consistent with findings from the first 
wave of the survey (Bishop and Montgomery, 1986). Note that the rule change in 
September 1981 lowered participation rates for establishments in all size categories. 
The Impact of TJTC on Employment 
In this section, we present an empirical model of the impact of TJTC on the total 
employment level of firms that get a subsidy. Programs such as TJTC fall under the 
general heading of targeted marginal employment subsidies. They are "targeted" because 
they subsidize only workers in certain demographic categories. They are "marginal" 
because only additional workers are subsidized, not those already employed before the 
start of the program. The theoretical effects of marginal employment subsidies, both 
targeted and nontargeted, have been analyzed in a number of works by Bassi (1985), 
Layard and Nickell (1980), Perloff (1982), Bishop and Wilson (1982), and Montgomery 
and Wilson (1985). A subsidy like TJTC can influence total employment at a firm by 
causing labor to be substituted for other factors of production (the substitution effect) 
and/or by increasing total output (the output effect). 
The output effect of an employment subsidy occurs if reduced cost can lead to a 
price reduction, thereby increasing quantity of the product demanded. Bassi (1985) 
argues that a marginal subsidy targeted to a relatively small demographic group is likely 
to have a very minor effect on output of the firm. The substitution effect associated with 
an employment subsidy can increase total employment in two ways. First, it can cause the 
firm to substitute labor for capital. Second, it can cause the firm to substitute less 
productive targeted workers for more productive nontargeted workers. Even with a fixed 
output level such substitution could raise total employment. 
In spite of its theoretical potential for raising employment, there are good reasons 
to hypothesize that a firm may hire a relatively large number of TJTC-subsidized workers 
without actually creating new jobs. TJTC is not a true marginal subsidy of the type 
described in the theoretical literature; it is actually a "recruitment" subsidy. This means 
that a firm need not expand its complement of targeted workers in order to obtain a 
2 
About 17 percent of the establishments interviewed in the first wave were familiar with TJTC We expect that interviewing these 
firms in 1980 may have increased the proportion of them using the program in 1982, but we see no reason to expect that it would 
distort the relationship between usage and employment growth Having informed the firms earlier should not bias the coefficient of 
TJTC use in the growth models. 
subsidy, as it would under a true marginal subsidy. It need only hire a new targeted 
worker, even one who merely replaces a nontargeted worker. The elasticity of 
substitution of targeted for nontargeted workers may, therefore, be very high. With high 
substitutability the employment gain per TJTC hiring may be very close to zero. 
The specification of the growth equation. The discussion above suggests the null 
hypothesis that hiring TJTC-subsidized workers does not influence an establishment's 
employment level. Empirically estimating the effect of TJTC on the level of a firm's 
employment is difficult, however. Employment level is determined by numerous factors 
that are difficult to observe and control for, factors such as relative input prices and 
technology. If these factors are relatively stable over a short time interval, however, they 
have little or no impact on the growth of employment during that interval. This implies 
that we can estimate a model of employment growth that excludes these factors with only 
minimal risk of omitted variable bias. For this reason, we chose to estimate the effect of 
the TJTC program on a firm's employment growth rather than its employment level. Our 
model mimics the approach taken by Perloff and Wachter (1979) in assessing the 
employment impact of the New Jobs Tax Credit of 1977. 
To develop this model, we begin by assuming that the level of a firm's 
employment at a point in time, Et, is related to the number of subsidized workers in its 
work force, TJTCt, plus a vector of other characteristics, Xt. For the moment we let the 
relationship be linear. 
E81 = α + ßTJTC81 + γX81 + ε (1) 
where all values are measured at the end of the subscripted year, and ε is an error term—ε 
~ N(0,σ
ε
). TJTC81 is defined here as the stock of subsidized workers at the end of 1981. 
As a proxy for this stock, we use the number of subsidized hires made during 1981.3 If 
the subsidized workers were simply hired to fill slots that would normally go to 
nonsubsidized workers, or if the firm claims a credit only for workers it would have hired 
anyway, then ß = 0. 
As stated above, instead of estimating equation (1), which would require a 
substantial complement of X variables, we use a model of the change in employment. If 
we assume no structural change in α, ß, or γ between 1980 and 1981, then from (1) it 
must be the case that 
E81 – E80 = ß (TJTC81 – TJTC80) + γ (X81 – X80) + w, (2) 
E E E 
where E is the average of E80 and E81, and w ~ N(0,σw).4 In fact, however, we prefer not 
to assume that ß is stable between 1980 and 1981. The change in rules disallowing 
3 
The number of subsidized hires m 1981 will understate the stock of TJTC-subsidized workers if many of those hired between 
January 1980 and January 1981 are still with the firm Given high turnover among workers from targeted populations, however, many 
workers hired more than a year before would have left the firm, and any who remained would be subsidized at only half the original 
rate. 
4 
Because we observe both positive and negative growth rates in our sample, the assumption that the error in the growth equations is 
approximately normal seems justified Nevertheless, that fact that about 30 percent of the establishments were clustered at zero growth 
could call this assumption into question. 
retroactive certification and disqualifying cooperative education students makes structural 
stability unlikely. Therefore, we estimate a model that includes separate measures of 
usage for 1980 and 1981 (as a proportion of employment). 
G 8 1 = E 8 1 – E8 0 = ß81 T JTC 8 1 = ß80 TJTC80 + γZ + w, (3) 
E E E 
where Z is a vector of variables designed to capture the determinants of employment 
growth. The vector Z imitates the set of variables used by Perloff and Wachter (1979). Z 
contains a long list of control variables from the first and second waves of the survey, 
including measures of changes in demand conditions, factors influencing labor turnover, 
and an array of other employer characteristics. The full list of variables is described in 
appendix A. 
It is clear in equation (3) that if the effect of TJTC on employment was positive 
and stable between 1980 and 1981, then 
ß81 = -ß80 > 0. 
That is, because it is the change in TJTC use that affects the change in employment, 
entering current and past usage into the model separately should cause past usage to have 
a negative sign5. The absolute value of ß80 is a measure of the effect of TJTC on 
employment in 1980. 
To disentangle the effects of the rule change we include regressions that measure 
TJTC81 for two alternative periods: the first eight months of 1981 and the 15- to 20-
month period from December 1980 to the interview date. (The Z vector is adjusted 
accordingly.) 
The final specification of the employment growth equation includes one 
modification from equation (3)—we relax the assumption that the effect of TJTC on 
employment is linear. A few very small firms have very large ratios of TJTC hires to 
employment. We hypothesize that the subsidy has a diminishing effect on growth as the 
ratio of subsidized to total employment rises. When subsidy usage represents a very large 
share of the firm's employment an additional hire is more likely to represent a windfall to 
the employer than a new job induced by the program. To allow for this nonlinearity the 
marginal impact of TJTC usage on growth is assumed to be a step function that has a 
discontinuity at TJTC81/E equal to .5. (The decision to use .5 as a cutoff, though 
somewhat arbitrary, seemed a reasonable choice.6) It is hypothesized that the coefficients 
5 
Because the dependent variable in equation (3) is a percentage rate of growth, the residual variances of this model are likely to be 
larger for small establishments than for larger establishments To correct for possible heteroskedasticity, a version of equation (3) was 
estimated using weighted least squares The weights were constructed by regressing the squared OLS error on the log of establishment 
size Neither the coefficients on the key subsidy variable nor their significance levels appreciably changed when the observations were 
weighted. 
6
 More formally, because we are using a spline, we include two TJTC usage variables one equal to TJTC-certifications/employment 
up to half of employment (mm [TJTC81/E, 5]) and one equal to TJTC-certifications/employment above half of employment (max 
(TJTCgl/E)- 5, 0] A spline was used instead of a quadratic in order to avoid multicollineanty in the 2SLS models 
on the upper portion of the splines will be closer to zero than will the coefficients on the 
lower portion of the splines. 
Regression results for employment growth. Columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 2 report 
the results of OLS estimation of alternative forms of equation (3). Columns 1 and 2 relate 
to employment growth from 12/80 to 12/81. Column 3 represents the period from 12/80 
to the interview date. Because TJTC use is likely to be correlated with participation in the 
on-the-job training programs, the models in Table 1 also control for use of the CETA and 
JTPA programs. Current usage of CETA is represented by CETA81. Past usage is 
represented by CETA80 (a dummy) and CETA79, which contains all subsidized hires in 
1979 including those for CETA, TJTC, and the Work Incentive Tax program (WIN). (In 
1979 most subsidized workers were hired through CETA.) What this means is that the 
CETA79 variable is measured with some error. Still, because use of TJTC and CETA are 
likely to be correlated, we need to control for CETA use to avoid having its influence 
bias the TJTC coefficients. 
As expected, the results in columns 1,2, and 3 in Table 2 give estimates of β81 and 
β80 that are opposite in sign but close in absolute value. The coefficients on the lower 
portions of the splines are significant in almost all cases. The absolute values for both β81 
and β80 are centered around .3, and β80 has the expected negative sign. These values 
imply that for every ten subsidized hirings up to half of employment, approximately three 
new jobs are created. The coefficients on the upper portions of the splines are close to 
zero and insignificant for all TJTC variables. The CETA variables also show statistical 
significance though their coefficients are small. 
The potential endogeneity of usage. Because firms with high employment growth 
will have more job openings that might potentially be filled with TJTC-eligible workers, 
use of the subsidy may be endogenous. In this case the OLS coefficients on TJTC81 and 
CETA81 will be biased upward. To cope with the potential endogeneity, equation (3) was 
7 
reestimated using two stage least squares (2SLS). 
Because the problem of endogeneity of usage was anticipated when the survey 
was designed, a great deal of thought was put into the development of questions that 
would provide a set of instruments for a 2SLS model of employment growth. The key 
was to obtain measures of variables that would influence TJTC hirings but not 
employment. Earlier studies have found that a firm's decision to participate in a subsidy 
program is significantly influenced by personal contacts about TJTC from local program 
administrators (Bishop, 1985; Bishop and Kang, 1986; and Bishop and Montgomery, 
1986). Such contacts should have no exogenous impact on employment growth, however. 
Therefore, the survey contained a set of questions about personal contacts and other 
questions specifically designed to produce instruments for a 2SLS model. Bishop (1985) 
found that the effect of a personal contact on the decision to participate in TJTC 
depended on a number of establishment characteristics such as the number of employees, 
previous subsidy use, proportion of young workers at the firm, and others. These 
characteristics were interacted with the contact variables to expand the set of instruments. 
A detailed discussion of the set of instrumental variables is provided in appendix B. 
7 
Another potential source of bias in the OLS models is any unobserved firm characteristic that influences both the likelihood of using TJTC 
and employment growth The standard way of treating this problem is to replace the program participation variable with its predicted 
value, which is what the 2SLS models do 
TABLE 2 
EFFECT OF TJTC ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AT SUBSIDIZED FIRMS 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Method 
Time Interval 
TJTCgl/E 
Up to 5 
Above 5 
TJTC8C1/E 
Up to 5 
Above 5 
CETA81/E > 0 
CE 1 A80_81/E 
Up to 5 
CETAffl/E > 0 
CETA79/E > 0 
R2 
Sample 
1 
OLS 
12/80-12/81 
3 3 4 " 
(2 0) 
- 055 
(5 ) 
- 250* 
(19) 
022 
(8 ) 
086 
(10) 
- 085* 
(18) 
086 
3255 
2 
OLS 
12/80-12/81 
216 
(14) 
- 043 
(4 ) 
- 251** 
(2 1) 
049 
( 7 ) 
092* *a 
(4 1) 
— 
007" 
(4 ) 
- 094* 
(2 2) 
094 
3255 
3 
OLS 
12/80-
Interview 
308*** 
(2 3) 
- 048 
( ? ) 
- 372*** 
(2 2) 
076 
(7 ) 
058*a 
(19) 
— 
- 030 
(1 1) 
- 162*** 
(2 8) 
107 
3255 
4 
2SLS 
12/80-12/81 
894b 
(10) 
- 615b 
(10) 
- 013 
(30) 
— 
— 
— 
- 390 
(93) 
758b 
(11) 
- 134* 
(19) 
086 
3115 
5 
2SLS 
12/80-
Interview 
908b 
(11) 
- 770b* 
(19) 
- 583 
(98) 
1 14b 
(118) 
- 261*** 
(2 60) 
095 
3115 
6 
OLS 
12/80-12/81 
(New/Hires) 
066^ 
(88) 
— 
- 063= 
(126) 
— 
— 
— 
046 
(28) 
- 079 
(34) 
— 
- I l l*** 
(2 21) 
114 
2298 
aThese are 0-1 variables for whether a subsidized worker was hired 
bVanable is replaced by its predicted value 
^Variable is a ratio of subsidized hires to new hires 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 1, 05, and 01 levels, respectively 
The 2SLS results are presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2. The coefficients on 
TJTC81 up to 50 percent of employment are very large but not statistically significant. 
The coefficients on the upper portion of the splines are negative, and in one case 
significant. The 2SLS coefficients imply that ten TJTC hirings produce about nine 
additional jobs at the firm. Unfortunately, these numbers are not plausible. The 
coefficients on CETA81 are actually negative, though not significant. 
Given the assumed positive feedback of employment growth on subsidy usage, 
reestimation of the employment growth equation using 2SLS should have lowered the 
coefficient on TJTC use. Instead, point estimates got larger and the statistical significance 
declined. Our interpretation of these results is that despite careful efforts to design 
questions that would provide an appropriate set of instruments, those instruments 
obtained were apparently not sufficient to capture the structural relationships with the 
necessary degree of precision. We believe that this may prove to be an inescapable 
problem with all nonexperimental evaluations of employment training programs. 
An alternative to 2SLS: Subsidized hires as a proportion of all new hires. In view 
of the unsatisfactory nature of the 2SLS results, a second approach to the problem of 
simultaneity bias was employed. Simultaneity causes the estimates of P81 obtained from 
the OLS estimation of (3) to be positively biased. The alternative approach is to provide 
another estimate that is also biased, but biased in the opposite direction. If the TJTC 
usage variable can be reconfigured so that the simultaneity biases its estimated effect 
toward zero, we may at least be able to place a lower bound on the program's true impact 
on employment at the firm (while the OLS results will represent an upper bound). We 
accomplish this by replacing the ratio of subsidized hires to employment with the ratio of 
TJTC-certified workers hired in 1981 to all workers hired in 1981. If employment growth 
has a strong positive effect on the number of new hirings, using new hirings in the 
denominator of the TJTC-use variable should build in a negative bias in its coefficient. 
The results of regressions using this approach are reported in column 6 of Table 1. 
Because a splined model gave a large negative coefficient on the upper portion of the 
spline, the model presented constrains the upper portion to be zero. 
The coefficients on TJTC use as a proportion of new hires have a low level of 
significance. However, the implied impacts of TJTC on employment growth are 
considerably more reasonable than those for the 2SLS results. Transforming the 
coefficient on TJTC81 in column 6 to reflect jobs created per certification (by multiplying 
by the mean ratio of employment to certifications, which is 2 in our sample) the new-
hires model implies that the number of added employees per TJTC certification is .13. 
8 
An alternative explanation, suggested by a referee, is that the instruments are unable to explain the arbitrary break in the spline. 
This view is consistent with the results of alternative runs in which we included a 2SLS model that predicted only the probability of 
using TJTC The usage coefficients were positive and significant at the .01 level, with (381 = 46 and P80 = - 148 These results imply an 
implausibly large effect for participating in TJTC 
To convert the coefficient on the effect of an increase in certifications as a proportion of new hires to the effect of certifications as a 
proportion of employment, we multiply the coefficient in model 6 by the ratio of employment to certifications via the following 
equation (where CERTS refers to certifications, EMPchg to employment change, and EMP to employment) 
This is about 40 percent of the impact estimated from the first model in Table 2. It 
represents, we believe, a reasonable lower bound on TJTC's impact on employment at 
participating firms. 
To summarize the regression results: we find some evidence that TJTC does 
induce participating firms to expand employment, though this conclusion is somewhat 
tentative. What is not tentative is our conclusion that at best, seven out of ten TJTC 
payments are for workers in jobs that would have existed absent the subsidy. This does 
not imply, however, that those seven payments are useless in terms of advancing the 
goals of the program—the subsidy may have induced the establishments to hire TJTC 
eligibles for jobs that would otherwise have gone to nontargeted workers. In the next 
section, therefore, we explore the effect of TJTC on who gets hired. 
The Effect of TJTC on the Proportion of Young Workers 
Even a targeted employment subsidy that does not create jobs overall may still 
fulfill its primary policy objective by creating jobs for targeted workers. To accomplish 
this, it must have some impact on whom the firms decide to hire. In this section we 
examine whether TJTC altered who was hired by estimating its impact on the proportion 
of young workers at the firm. Ideally, we would like to observe the impact of hiring TJTC 
eligibles on the proportion of targeted workers at the firm, but employers are unlikely to 
know how many workers meet TJTC's complicated eligibility requirements. Instead of 
asking about the number of eligibles, therefore, the survey asked about an easily 
identifiable population into which about 86 percent of TJTC eligibles fall: workers under 
the age of 25. 
The 1982 NCRVE Survey asked each establishment (1) what proportion of its 
work force was under 25 currently, and (2) what proportion was under 25 two years ago. 
We employ two alternative specifications in estimating the impact of TJTC on this 
proportion. First, we regress the current proportion of young workers on a set of variables 
including the past proportion of young workers, a TJTC-use variable, and other firm 
characteristics. As an alternative, we also estimate a model of the change in the 
proportion of youth over the previous two years with past and current TJTC use as 
independent variables. As above, for the change model we expect a 
positive coefficient on TJTC81 and a negative coefficient on past usage. In this case, 
however, past usage is CETA79, which includes subsidized hirings from all programs. 
The other independent variables in these equations differ only slightly from those 
included in the growth models. A run including the full set of independent variables 
appears in appendix A. One important difference, however, between the employment-
growth models and proportion-youth models is the inclusion of employment growth itself 
as an independent variable in the latter. Rapidly growing firms should be more willing to 
select younger, less experienced workers to fill vacancies. We expect, therefore, that the 
coefficient of employment growth will be positive in the proportion-youth models. 
The TJTC usage variable, TJTC81, in the proportion-youth models includes one 
important modification from the growth models. Firms can deliberately select targeted 
where "c; is the coefficient from model 6 in Table 2 The ratio of employment to new hires in our sample is 2 Because CERTS is 
generally small relative to new hires and employment, we assume that the percentage change in certifications will dominate the 
percent changes in new hires and employment and the last term on the right will be close to 1 
T A B L E 3 
IMPACT OF TARGETED EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES ON THE SHARE OF THE WORK FORCE UNDER 
A G E 25 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Level Model Change Model 
TJTC81a 114*** 
(2 12) 
Up to 5 120*** 
(2 1) 
Above 5 007 
(2 ) 
CETA79 - 07* 
( - 1 8 ) 
Employment Growth 1980-82 069*** 
(5 2) 
Proportion under age 25 in 1980 829* * * 
(75 0) 
R2 718 
Sample 2879 
aVanable represents hiring of workers known to be eligible at the time of hiring 
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 1, 05, and 01 levels, respectively 
- 069** 
(2.03) 
078*** 
(5.8) 
.046 
2879 
workers over nontargeted workers only if the former are recognized as eligible at the time 
the hiring decision is made—a fortuitous discovery of the eligibility of a recent hire 
should have no direct impact on youth's share of employment. Our usage variable, 
therefore, is not the proportion of workers who are eligible, but only the proportion 
known to be eligible at the time they were hired.10 
Estimation results for the proportion of young workers. The estimation results for 
the two models of youth share of employment are presented in Table 3. The TJTC81 
variable is highly significant in both the level model and the change model. Furthermore, 
the positive and significant effect of employment growth on the youth share implies that 
TJTC has both a 
direct and indirect impact on the proportion of young workers at the firm. To gain some 
sense of the magnitude of these effects, we use an example. Consider a firm with 100 
workers, 27 percent of whom are youth (our sample mean). Using the coefficient from 
column 1 in Table 3, hiring ten TJTC eligibles raises the proportion of youth to 28.2 
percent directly. But, according to Table 2, these hirings also increase growth of 
employment by 3 percent, which raises youth's share by another .2 percent (that is, by 3 x 
.067). This further increases the proportion of young workers to 28.4 percent. These 
calculations imply that the ten subsidized hires open 2.4 jobs for young workers (that is, 
.284*103 — 27) in a firm of 100 workers.11 
What do the coefficients in Table 3 imply about the extent to which TJTC hires 
cause intrafirm displacement of nontargeted workers? The above example suggests that 
the ten subsidized hires generated about three new jobs and that 2.25 of these went to 
youth, creating an additional .75 jobs for adults. Taken at face value these numbers would 
absolve TJTC of causing significant displacement of adult workers. They imply that the 
program may even increase adult employment slightly by causing firms to expand. This 
calculation, of course, uses our most optimistic finding about the effect of TJTC on the 
subsidized firm's employment. But even if using TJTC were to have a zero impact on a 
firm's employment, the ten subsidized Wrings in our firm of 100 workers would displace 
1.82 adults. This is still a reasonably small displacement effect. Our overall conclusion, 
therefore, is that any intrafirm displacement of adults caused by TJTC is likely to be 
fairly minor. 
Conclusions and Discussion of Policy Implications 
This paper used the results of a unique survey of employers to estimate (a) the 
extent to which using the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) induced subsidized employers 
to expand employment, and (b) the extent to which TJTC use caused the participating 
firm to hire more targeted workers. Our best estimate implies that no more than three new 
jobs are created at a participating establishment for every ten subsidized hirings that 
establishment makes. Our estimates of TJTC's impact on youth's share of employment 
suggest that TJTC use does significantly increase the hiring of targeted workers. 
10 
As in the growth models, our proxy for the proportion of known-to-be-eligibles at the firm is the number hired in the relevant time 
period 
11 
These estimates are rough for two reasons First, the proportion of workers under 25 is a crude proxy for the proportion of targeted 
labor—young workers form only a portion of the targeted population (in our sample, about 85%) Second, in the proportion-youth 
equation we used the hiring of known-to-be-eligibles while in the growth equation we used all subsidized hirings. The effect of all 
subsidized hirings on the proportion of young workers might be smaller than that used above to calculate the displacement 
Furthermore, these additional targeted workers do not appear to displace nontargeted 
adults (though they may displace nontargeted youth). 
Perhaps the most interesting implication of our results is that when the 
government grants a tax credit for these ten subsidized hirings, at least seven of those tax 
credits are paid for job slots that would have existed even without the subsidy. Policy 
makers might be pleased nevertheless if those other seven hirings represent a transfer of 
jobs from nontargeted workers to targeted ones. But our results imply otherwise. We find 
that ten hirings create less than 2.5 jobs for young workers. If targeted youth are 
displacing nontargeted youth, our results may understate the program's potential to create 
targeted jobs. Still, we are led to conclude that the great majority of claims for tax credits 
are for workers who would have been hired even in the absence of the subsidy. These are 
simple transfer payments to employers. 
What do our results imply about the cost of job creation under TJTC? Program 
data for fiscal 1985 (the most recent available) indicate that the TJTC program made tax 
expenditures of about $505 million for 621,889 certifications. This gives a cost per TJTC 
certification of about $812. Using this measure of certification cost, our most optimistic 
results about the employment effect of TJTC imply that in our sample the cost of creating 
a job through TJTC was $5,270. Our more pessimistic results (using the last model in 
Table 2) suggest a cost of $11,581 per job created. The lower figure is fairly consistent 
with similar estimates made elsewhere in the literature. For example, Bassi's (1985) 
simulation model predicts that jobs created through a targeted marginal subsidy will cost 
between $2,198 and $5,708 apiece. Bishop (1981) estimates the cost of jobs created by 
the New Jobs Tax Credit at between $2,000 and $5,500 per job. The higher of our 
estimates, $11,581 per job created, is about twice the upper bound of the Bassi and 
Bishop estimates. Yet we think this estimate is closer to the true cost.12 
It was recognized that problems caused by possible simultaneous equations bias 
in our estimates require that our results be viewed with some caution. However, given the 
effort that went into designing the NCRVE survey specifically to address the issues 
raised in this paper, we believe that our estimates are not only the best available measures 
of TJTC's impact on participating firms, but the best that are ever likely to be produced 
for the time period studied. The fact that we obtained measures of the level of usage of 
the subsidy gives our study more power than similar attempts to measure the impact of 
employment subsidies. For example, in their study of the New Jobs Tax Credit of 1978, 
Perloff and Wachter (1979) were able to test only whether having "heard of" that 
program caused firms to grow more rapidly. At the very least we have been able to set a 
reasonable upper bound on the effect of a subsidized hiring on a firm's total employment; 
it creates between .13 and .3 jobs. Placing the impact within this narrow a range provides 
information that should prove useful in the design of employment policy. 
A final caveat should be offered about the employment effects discussed in this 
paper. We have estimated the impacts of TJTC on employment at participating firms 
only. These effects may be offset to some degree by reductions in employment in 
competing firms, or in firms producing capital goods (see Perloff, 1982). Such general-
equilibrium considerations are beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
12
 We calculate these values by multiplying the coefficients on the upper and lower portions of the splines in the relevant model by 
the mean sample ratio of certifications to employment above and below 5, respectively This gives the estimate of jobs created per 
employee at the firm We divide this value into the subsidy payments per employee at the firm, using $812 as our estimated payment 
per certification 
Appendix A: Independent Variables in the Employment 
Growth Equation 
The specification of the percentage employment growth equation used in this 
study parallels that used by Perloff and Wachter (1979) in examining the employment 
impact of the 1977-78 New Jobs Tax Credit—a nontargeted marginal employment 
subsidy. Perloff and Wachter, using a U.S. Census survey of establishments, regressed 
the percentage change in employment on (1) percentage change in nominal sales, (2) a set 
of four size of-establishment dummies, (3) a set of three regional dummies, (4) a set of 
one-digit industry dummies, and (5) dummies for which tax form the firm used (an 
indicator of type of proprietorship). Their key program variable was a dummy for 
whether the firm knew about the New Jobs Tax Credit. 
Our estimation of the employment growth equation improves upon that of Perloff 
and Wachter in having more detailed data on establishments and a larger sample. First we 
included a set of variables designed to capture exogenous changes in demand conditions. 
In this category we included the percentage change in real sales over the previous two 
years. This variable may be endogenous, but, like Perloff and Wachter, we lacked an 
appropriate set of instruments with which to use an instrumental variables model. We 
also include a proxy for previously anticipated changes in demand conditions: the change 
in employment from 80 to 82 anticipated by the establishment at the time of the first-
wave interview. 
A second set of variables relates to the establishment's experience with labor 
turnover (all taken from the first wave of the survey). The rationale here is that holding 
constant the conditions of product demand and labor supply, turnover may affect 
employment growth by dictating the number of hires required to maintain a given size of 
the work force. Finally, we included a set of more general characteristics of the 
establishment and its work force such as size, the proportion of skilled workers, the 
proportion unionized, and others. One variable that our data set lacked was a direct 
measure of average wages of workers at the establishment. Our survey provided 
information on wages only for the last worker hired. As a measure of the establishment's 
wage position relative to other establishments, we regressed the wage of the last hired 
worker on a vector of characteristics of the worker and the job for which he was hired. 
The error from this regression was used as a measure of whether the establishment paid 
higher wages (a positive error) or lower wages (a negative error) than other 
establishments hiring this type of worker in a similar job. 
We also included detailed sets of industry and location dummies. 
A sample run for the models of employment growth and proportion of young 
workers appears in Table Al. 
Appendix B: Discussion of the Variables Used as Instruments in 
2SLS Models 
The variables employed as instruments were those that were observed to be 
important in determining whether an establishment participated in the TJTC program at 
all (by hiring at least one subsidized worker) in studies by Bishop (1985), Bishop and 
T A B L E A l 
SAMPLE R U N S WITH F U L L SETS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Employment 
Growth (t-stat) Proportion 
Variable Mean (std dev ) 12/80-Interview Young (t-stat) 
Program Variables 
TJTC81/E 
Up to 5 
Above 5 
TJTCVE 
Up to 5 
Above 5 
CETA81 > 0 
CETAg,, > 0 
CETA79 > 0 
Change in Demand 
AEMP 
AEMP > 0 
Expected %AUnit Sales 
Actual %AUmt Sales > 0 
Expected AEMP 1980-82 
Turnover Variables 
New Hire Rate 1979 
Quit Rate 1979 
Fire Rate 1979 
Layoff Criterion (senionty=l, 
productivity=0) 
Flexibility to Fire 1979 
Length of Probation Period for 
New Hires 
No Probationary Period 
Other Employer Characteristics 
Est SIZE (In) 1980 
Est SIZE 50" 
Est SIZE/Firm SIZE 
Residual Wage (In) 
Machinery Cost (In) 
Proportion Part-time 
Proportion Unionized 
AProportion Unionized 
R2 
0088 
0312 
007 
002 
038 
045 
023 
- 028 
091 
042 
084 
10 73 
089 
048 
015 
41 
49 65 
2 81 
24 
2 93 
25 
48 
00 
1 70 
18 
10 
- 000 
(05) 
(08) 
(04) 
(06) 
(19) 
(21) 
(10) 
(40) 
(22) 
(27) 
(23) 
(48 27) 
(12) 
(08) 
(05) 
(27) 
(50 0) 
(124) 
(43) 
(144) 
(63) 
(118) 
(32) 
(149) 
(27) 
(28) 
(05) 
308 
- 048 
- 372 
076 
058 
030 
- 168 
— 
— 
386 
- 266 
001 
- 008 
— 
— 
007 
— 
027 
- 08 
- 067 
05 
- 004 
057 
011 
-.011 
-.009 
— 
11 
(2 29) 
( - 6 7 ) 
( - 2 21) 
(75) 
(187) 
(105) 
( - 2 77) 
(7 01) 
( - 4 28) 
(5 23) 
( - 13) 
(32) 
(2 71) 
(2 66) 
(9 58) 
(3 41) 
(-.95) 
(3 24) 
(2 93) 
( - 5 1 ) 
( - 180 ) 
120 
007 
— 
— 
— 
— 
- 07 
069 
- 02 
015 
018 
— 
— 
- 046 
086 
— 
000 
- 006 
— 
012 
— 
003 
- 020 
- 002 
009 
- 010 
012 
72 
(2 10) 
(19) 
( - 1 8 1 ) 
(5 22) 
( - 1 04) 
(56) 
(60) 
(100) 
(125) 
(113) 
(-1.26) 
(4 42) 
(133) 
( - 2 36) 
( "1 12) 
(85) 
( - 9 2 ) 
(72) 
aAlso included were dummies for industry and location 
Kang (1986), and Bishop and Montgomery (1986). The participation studies cited 
indicate that the most important of the instruments is personal contacts about TJTC or 
CETA that were initiated by agencies outside the firm. (An offer to refer TJTC-eligible 
workers doubles the probability that a firm participates in the program [Bishop, 1985].) 
Dummy variables were created for initial contacts made by, respectively, a government 
agency, a trade association, a local business organization, or some other agency. 
Dummies were also created for whether the employment service had initiated a contact to 
offer subsidy-eligible referrals, and whether there was more than one such contact. All 
dummies were denned separately for TJTC and CETA. 
Bishop (1985) found that whether an outside contact caused the firm to participate 
in TJTC depended on a variety of firm characteristics. Consequently another set of 
instruments was created by interacting the dummies described above with the following 
firm characteristics: log of establishment employment, dummies for previous use of 
subsidy programs, membership in a local business organization, presence of a personnel 
office at the establishment, share of 1980 employment under age 25, length of training 
period for new hires, whether the firm has a probationary period for new hires, and the 
log of the length of that period. Other instrumental variables were (1) dummies for 
previous use of subsidy programs, (2) previous use of the employment service, (3) 
membership in a local business organization, (4) the perceived amount of paperwork 
required to obtain an OJT contract, (5) a variable measuring negative attitudes toward 
government, (6) knowledge of the CETA program, (7) whether the firm fired anyone 
during the fourth quarter of 1979 (a proxy for flexibility in terminating unwanted 
employees), and (8) measures of the 1979 layoff rate, quit rate, and induced quit rate, 
respectively. 
In total the structural models of participation contained 33 variables that were not 
in the structural model of growth and 28 variables that were not in the structural model of 
the 1981 new hire rate. The R2 for the reduced form models predicting the TJTC usage 
variable ranged from .074 to .091. 
REFERENCES 
Bassi, Laurie J 1985 "Evaluating Alternative Job Creation Strategies " Economic Inquiry 23 
(October) 671-90 1981 "Employment in the Construction and Distribution Industries The Impact 
of the New Jobs Tax Credit " In Studies in Labor Markets, edited by Sherwin Rosen Chicago 
University of Chicago Press 
Bishop, John H 1985 Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Findings from Employer Surveys Prepared for the 
Department of Health Services under grant #DHHS113A-83 Columbus National Center for 
Research in Vocational Eduction, Ohio State University September 
Bishop, John H , and Suk Kang 1986 "Multivariate Models of Employer Use of TJTC " In The Effects of 
TJTC on Employer Columbus National Center for Research in Vocational Education, Ohio State 
University 
Bishop, John H , and Mark Montgomery 1986 "Evidence on Firm Participation in Targeted Employment 
Subsidy Programs " Industrial Relations 25 (Winter) 56-64 
Bishop, John H , and Charles Wilson 1982 "The Impact of Employment Subsidies on Firm Behavior " In 
Jobs for the Disadvantaged, edited by Robert Haveman and John Palmer Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution 
Burtless, Gary. 1985 "Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful Evidence from a Wage Voucher Experiment" 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 39 (October) 105-14 
Haveman, Robert, and John Palmer, eds 1982 Jobs for the Disadvantaged Washington, DC Brookings 
Institution 
Layard, K., and S Nickell 1980. "The Case for Subsidizing Extra Jobs " The Economic Journal 1 51-53 
Montgomery, Mark, and Charles A Wilson 1985 "On the Dynamic Response of a Firm to an Employment 
Subsidy with a Fixed Threshold " Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (December) 405-22 
Perloff, Jeffrey 1982 "Micro and Macro Effects " In Jobs for the Disadvantaged, edited by Robert 
Haveman and John Palmer Washington, DC Brookings Institution 
Perloff, Jeffrey, and Michael Wachter 1979 "The New Jobs Tax Credit An Evaluation of the 1977-78 Wage 
Subsidy Program" American Economic Review (May):173-79 
